Germany First, but Not so Fast: Admiral Ernest J. King and the War in the Pacific, Dec 1941-Aug 1942

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Published 2023-08-21
Germany First, but Not so Fast: Admiral Ernest J. King and the War in the Pacific, December 1941-August 1942
With Trent Hone
Part of Pacific Week on WW2TV
   • The Pacific  
More WW2TV content about New Guinea and the Solomon Islands
   • New Guinea and the Solomon Islands  
Battles at Sea and Naval History on WW2TV
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“Germany first” was the cornerstone of Allied strategy in World War II. Long before Imperial Japan attacked in December 1941, the U.S. military had prioritized the European theater and the defeat of Nazi Germany. However, the scope and scale of the Japanese onslaught was unanticipated. It outpaced the ability of the United States and its Allies to plan. They were forced to react, but their commitment to a European strategy constrained their options. How could they “hold” in the Pacific while preparing for a decisive blow against Germany?

Admiral Ernest J. King, the U.S. Navy’s new commander-in-chief (COMINCH), navigated this challenge. First, he personally took control of a substantial portion of the Pacific theater, unifying direction at a crucial time. Second, he drove the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) to clarify Pacific command arrangements and establish areas of responsibility. In parallel with this, he convinced his U.S. Army peers to establish bases in the South Pacific that could stem the Japanese advance and protect the lines of communication to Australia and New Zealand. Finally, King pooled sufficient resources in the South Pacific to undertake an offensive that would challenge the Japanese and push them back.

This presentation will explore how King achieved these accomplishments. It will highlight King's strategy of dynamic opportunism rooted in underlying principles of maritime conflict. Unlike his peers in the Army, who embraced a centralized approach congruent with today’s dominant strategic paradigm of aligning ends, ways, and means, King acted first and thereby created new options. For King, strategy was a rapid sensemaking process informed by tacit knowledge and core principles that caused strategic priorities to emerge. Rather than selecting from available options, King made decisions and thereby created new options. This approach was crucial in early 1942, when the Allies found themselves facing a series of potentially crippling strategic dilemmas.

Trent Hone is an award-winning naval historian. He has presented at the Society of Military History’s Annual Meeting, the McMullen Naval History Symposium, and numerous other conferences. trenthone.com/

Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945 by Trent Hone
UK uk.bookshop.org/a/5843/9781682472934
USA bookshop.org/a/21029/9781682478363

Fighting in the Dark: Naval Combat at Night: 1904-1944 by Vincent O'Hara and Trent Hone
UK uk.bookshop.org/a/5843/9781399030519
USA bookshop.org/a/21029/9781682477809

Trent Hone's previous appearance on WW2TV
Mastering the Art of Command: Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Victory in the Pacific
youtube.com/live/Cm75ZfV4PSA

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All Comments (21)
  • Taking the offensive in August 1942 feels awfully early. I wonder how that turned out? Seriously the whole idea of attacking Guadalcanal at that time was brilliant and risky. That decision alone underpins Admiral King's impressive legacy.
  • @PalleRasmussen
    Drach calls King "Semper Iratus" in his portrait of him, but is not unfavourable to him. He does seem to like Lee more, but I must admit to a certain liking of the Sniper Admiral myself.
  • @Chiller11
    An excellent presentation that emphasizes the significant accomplishments of Admiral King in the Pacific Theatre under very difficult circumstances. It does demand a little more complex analysis of him particularly among his numerous detractors.
  • @hazchemel
    I've always and instinctively admired Admiral King, and his management of the total fleet was incredible, remarkable, and puts him in the top tier of our military traditions like Wellington, Napoleon, G. Julius Caesar etc.
  • @marchuvfulz
    Another excellent presentation. Many thanks to Trent and Paul.
  • @KMN-bg3yu
    Wonderful subject and a fantastic guest
  • @mathewkelly9968
    The start is weird , of course it was Germany first , but by the time the US entered the war the Kreigsmarine had nothing the US Navy had to worry about besides U Boats . Japan actually had a navy so of course the majority of large surface combatants went to the Pacific
  • I always find Admiral King very interesting. The US were lucky to have him in this position. I found the presentation very informative, showing the big lines of thinking and acting in the Pacific theatre in the early months. Best greetings, Peter
  • @jamesthompson8133
    King didn’t like anyone. Great show guys! Always informative and entertaining!
  • @lewistrott417
    Great companion episode to Trent's previous episode about Nimitz. Again Trent is very concise and understandable, and as usual, an exceptional offering from WW2TV. Thank you.
  • @user-hw1qo2mu9e
    Absolutely amazing! There are too many things to put in a comment but the entire thing was incredible. I like having both sides in the conversation the British opinion of King and the comparison to Monty is interesting. As an American I love King and despise Monty so I might need to reconsider my position on Monty. One thing that's absolutely certain is that King doesn't get the love he deserves. He's right there with Nimitz in the best naval officers America has ever produced conversation but most people don't even know he existed. From what I understand a lot of his problems with the Royal Navy started when he was young and continued in WW1. Drach did an excellent job of covering the wider view of King it doesn't have so much of the deep dive personal stuff but it's definitely worth checking out. I also like how you point out that it was perfectly possibly for King to be an A-Hole and still be an excellent commander. And lastly I think what you touched on at the end is very important. If King hadn't been so insistent on keeping pressure on Japan and they'd been left alone for years while the allies focused on Europe by the time the allies got to the Pacific it would've been much worse than it was historically. If Japan had been given time to really dig in and fortify every position not to mention build up a large supply of oil and other resources the fight to retake each Island would've cost far more lives. Thank you both very much!
  • @ramal5708
    One of the factor why King really hated the British was the continuous request by the Admiralty of American capital ships and more American naval assets for the Atlantic like in the beginning requesting both carriers Wasp and Hornet, the fast battleships Washington and North Carolina plus other smaller vessels to the Atlantic by early 1942 to summer 1942 as they were being used as either convoy escort or to counter Tirpitz threat if she was to sortie from the base which never happened. This frustrated King especially in May 1942 - July 1942 since he needed Wasp in the Pacific and both fast battleships much earlier for his drawn up Guadalcanal operation, yet he would be able to get Wasp and North Carolina on time for Watchtower, not until battleships Massachusetts and other South Dakota class were put into service that he finally be able to get all North Carolina class and South Dakota in Pacific theater. Also Roosevelt's Europe first policy prevented him to transfer assets into the Pacific, not until the USN lost Wasp and Hornet plus Saratoga being damaged for a long haul and Enterprise also being damaged but partially ready for battle that Roosevelt finally agreed to pour more naval assets and resources into Guadalcanal, seeing that they managed to get this far against Japan in Solomons, so by November 1942 the USN had Washington and South Dakota in South Pacific area, plus more Army divisions underway into the area to relieve the battered Marines on Guadalcanal, also more land based aircraft. FDR kind of reluctant in sending these assets as he would rather use them for North Africa operation. Mind you Operation Watchtower was King's plan and idea so like any other commander he wanted it to work and drive the Japanese out of the area, he even tried his hardest to move Guadalcanal area into USN area of responsibility, since prior to that it was US Army's area under Macarthur, which he despised more than the British.
  • @iKvetch558
    The thing I always remember about the whole "Europe first" policy, is that it was ultimately limited by real world factors that most folks fail to take into consideration. Such as the fact that it was impossible to send more than a certain amount of forces across the Atlantic to England/Africa/The Med until the Battle of the Atlantic is basically won...so the US cannot really enact Europe first until later in 1943 after the U-Boats have pretty much withdrawn due to their own losses.
  • @philbosworth3789
    The UK's 'favourite' US Admiral got a very fair hearing here thanks to the advocacy of Trent Hone. Well done Trent, that was an episode well worth listening to.
  • @jimgrundy1278
    Another fascinating presentation. Thank you. Could King's attitude be summed up by something Michael Caine's character said in 'The Italian Job'? "It's a very difficult job and the only way to get through it is we all work together as a team. And that means you do everything I say."
  • @lllordllloyd
    I normally struggle a little with presenters who speak quickly. But Trent is so clear, so lucid, and the presentation is so well structured, thjat this was an absolute pleasure to listen to. King was like the 'good' Stilwell or MacArthur: arrogant, difficult, stubborn... but unlike his army counterparts, unquestionably brilliant.
  • @gmdyt1
    Another superb talk. Thank you.
  • So great. I discovered Admiral King in Ian W Toll's trilogy. Very interesting character. I love that offense defense theme here, seems much in line with King in Ian's books. pushing, mandating Guadalcanal operations
  • I'm worried. I knew that was Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy immediately. I'm afraid I know more historic figures than current ones. I don't know whether I should be worried? This and other channel's Papua/New Guinea are really important to watch. Aussie Civilian Military Force (Draftees) did wonders fighting under the worst imaginable conditions. I gained a new respect for our brothers in Australia from being ferocious fighters, but also for putting up with McArthur. Love, David
  • @gagamba9198
    A compelling defence of King. Whether together or independently, Messrs Hone and Parshall are always fantastic guests. For me they're always must watch and must read. I understand why Churchill and FDR decided 'Germany first', yet by early Nov '40 the Battle of Britain has been won, Sea lion's threat is gone, so the staging area for the reconquest on continental Europe has been secured. Yes, the U-boat campaign is dire, but it's not a conquest threat. By mid Feb '42 Japan had taken Malaya. It gained the significant rubber, tin, and iron ore resources there as well as tungsten, manganese, and bauxite. At the end of first week of March the East Indies are under control. The oil resources and refining facilities of British Borneo (Sarawak), Brunei, and DEI are in Japanese hands. The British have done a very good job with scorched earth, and the Dutch less so. Though production has fallen greatly, given these wells and refineries are far from Allied harassment it's evident they'll soon be sustaining the IJA and IJN. Thailand, which was the rice basket of SE Asia, is in Japanese hands. French Indochina's resources were already under Japanese control. When strategic resources are discussed, cordage (rope) doesn't come to mind immediately. Yet the USN declared albaca fibre (aka Manila hemp, from a banana tree) one in 1937 and began to secretly stockpile it. By July 1942 the stockpile was nearly depleted. Manila hemp was highly desired and strategic because it resisted breaking down in salt water, which is great for a navy and a fishing fleet. Where was America's chief supplier? Mindanao, Philippines. In Japanese hands. Looking at the Pacific in May '42, Japan had won the resource empire of Germany's dreams. Moreover, Japan's enormous merchant fleet was not bottled up by blockade like Germany's. Though Churchill and FDR understood Japan was a threat, were 'what if' questions asked and taken seriously? What if we lose Singapore? What if the Japanese capture Burma and threaten India? What if all the Americans in the Philippines become POWs? Whatever King's motivations were, thank heavens he kept his eye on this ball.