Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument

I think you at least alluded to this, but I just want to write it like this because I think it was easier for me to understand the whole discussion of pain: You can hallucinate an external stimulus like the existence of a mug or a sound or something like that, because your mental perception of external stimuli can be wrong. It is not possible to hallucinate the sensation of pain. If you experience the sensation that you describe as pain, you are in pain by definition (as it is defined as an internal sensation). It makes sense to say that you "know" something only if it can be wrong. Thus, it linguistically makes no sense to say that you "know" you are in pain, because you can't be wrong about it.

Very valuable video. If we want to understand the current analytical side of philosophy, we need to understand investigations and after kripke on it ^_^

Lee's Elucidation: A finite number of words must be made to represent an infinite number of things and possibilities. Language Habits in Human Affairs, 1941, Irving J. Lee.

Nice! Could you in the near future (◇A or ◯ A or ▢ A) make a series about Saul Kripke and the connections between his thougts about philosophy and (modal) logic)? I would appreciate that. Have a nice day.

A great video again, congrats. I especially like Mullhal's book on the issue and also Stern's interpretation. R. Crusoe could not make up his own language unless he writes it down for others to see, private ostension in impossible.

Great video! You should've discussed Sellars' discussion of Ryle's logical behaviorism in EPM, however, to contrast Wittgenstein's moderate behaviorism with the reductive behaviorism of Ryle.

I'm nearly certain that even Wittgenstein would want you to jettison 60% of his material, perhaps even 100%.

If I grant you the ability to assign meanings to signs so that they signify wholly private experience, how would you do that in a way that shows it is different from how your parents / peers taught you the signs of ordinary language? What form of life is this private language [game] embedded in? I don't know if Wittgenstein would deny qualia, only that neither affirmation nor denial can be played with qualia. I don't know enough languages to say whether his observations on "to know" and their scope in this game obtain everywhere or if it a quirk of germanic or indo-european languages. Anyway, the moment you could demonstrate to someone this private language then it's no longer private basically by definition; and if you can't show it, then what are you actually talking about? This is a mistake of philosophy, supposing that private referents exist in public languages. He has to undo the beguiling "picture theory" everywhere, including in the cartesian theater. We run the risk of falling out of one picture theory into another by overemphasizing the criteria by which we can judge that we have given meaning to a sign, which is essentially a return to the rule-following paradox, in disguise. None of it is skeptical. The possibility of being mistaken comes with the possibility of being right. But if we strip away too much of the forms of life surrounding a language game we lose the meaning as well and so having thrown out the whole external world to bracket our private experience then nothing could possibly apply. This is the very error inherent in the entire Tractatus, that we can strip away coincidental facts to get at the heart of the correspondence of words to reality and the correspondence of words to other words themselves as a map of reality. The varnish that wore away the coincidental facts wore away everything else too. Well we all say "pain" so we must be referring to something ---- picture theory, in disguise, as if to say the grammar of our expression must have ontological import. "We must be referring to something" --- our words have meaning, yes, there are language games around pain, go to the doctor to play one, but it would be our job as philosophers to understand this game, and maybe the job of linguists to explain why the grammar of "things" was used here. But short of re-writing the Tractatus, how would our grammar have ontological import like that?

Could my assertion that 'I know I am in pain' just be the flip-side of unjustified true belief? As knowledge cannot be based on a lucky guess, neither can it be based on a situation in which 'guessing' cannot apply. So, grammatically, here, 'I know' only adds emphasis to 'Ow!'.

Try New Ithkuil.

To me it is not obvious that rule following is necessary or sufficient to establish a reference relation between a sign and its referent. The reason for this is that I tend to think that any reference relation has to be reducible to resemblance or correlation or causation or a combination of them. Otherwise the reference relation would seem like something supernatural. And even worse, this time it seems like there can be no argument from introspection to justify it like with qualia. It’s existence would be mere speculation. So this might be the reason why I never found the private language argument very convincing. It always seemed to me that we are just dancing around the central problem by focusing on rule following. Rule following has the same problem as well. Either it can be reduced to a physical fact. or it is supernatural or there is simply no such thing.

This means 'it's offensive' really translates to 'I am offended,' or as you've brilliantly put it, 'aaaargh.' Discussing one's own mental state is not truth-apt, nor does it have a criterion of correctness, according to Wittgenstein's insights. Yet, we not only reify our own sensations but also often talk about others' mental states as if they're concrete objects, labeling people as having a 'problematic mental state - ist.' We then act upon these labels, affecting lives through law enforcement or public humiliation, based on our own behaviorist interpretations of the actions of those in question. We call out and prosecute not merely based on actions but on the mental states we presume to understand from those actions. This is a profound area for contemplation. Wittgenstein, who argued that language is a communal activity and cannot express truly private experiences like the 'beetle in a box,' would likely find the current state of discourse, especially the censorious nature of our progressive values that operate through claims of knowing others' mental states, deeply problematic. There's much to ponder here as we navigate this nebulous terrain of understanding and assigning mental states.

"Ahhhhh" means, I like it. More like Aha ;-) From W. I follow the PWA - private world argument - downside of intersubjektivity. And my PLA, personal logic arg. But its a little more difficult. In logic, if there is any reason to introduce a posited assertion instead of an axiomatic justification, then you are implying that there might be others (conditions of possibility - Kant) that can share this posited assertion (and not necessarily must, as in the case of justification). There must be (possible) beings who can freely consent. Question: do we need to fullfill the PLA other people or just the possibility of other people? There is a nondualistic solution: we need possible factual others, not possible theoretical others. So we have two different realms of possibility. A problem for all idealists ;-)

So the conclusion is that language is a social, communal activity thay gets its meaning through some form of verification with the norm of the language. Why are private sensations different? Toothache refers to a certain embodied feeling instructed by certain nerves which are shared by all normal humans. When we say toothache, we are referring to the same beatle, because we share the same physiology. Although It cannot be verified that someone is lying, or perhaps misunderstands the use of the word toothache or each part of it, tooth and ache. This does not matter, these are isolated cases. To return to the conclusion, i can verify my own pain as a sensation caused by certain nerve endings, and perhaps even due to something i.e lack of brushing. This has meaning in the language due to our shared physiology. Am i misunderstanding something?

As someone living a solitary life by choice, the idea that I can apply rules to myself is a crucial question. At the very least, I'll say it can be difficult, maybe impossible, but certainly, there are some major rules that would seem nigh impossible to apply, yet I do, which is an act of extreme willpower and agency. I'm not just a mote of dust living in a Brownian sea. So, I know solitary minds can make rules. I also believe the hierarchical nature of the mind (conscious vs subconscious) allows for a horizon and true propositions that can be given to the conscious, from a subconscious trained by the conscious. It all intersects with virtue and the rules of reality as well. Great and interesting stuff.

ahhhhaaaaahhhhh!!

we apologise ---- Brighton really is a thing

I think old Ludwig was quite interesting

Imho the private language argument preupposes the very thing it is meant to show: externalism about meaning. It is therefore implicitly circular. Why on earth would an internalist accept that meaning is in any way related to criteria of correctness? Even if in the beetle or diary case it were the case that there are no definite criteria of correctness accessible to the speaker... so what? If, for example, a Chomskyan view of language is right, then that's completely irrelevant to the meaning of a word (cf. his distinction between I-language and E-language). I gotta be honest, I just find the argument very overrated. Your video is of course excellent - insane level of depth!

Aye Yo Dare I Ask How One Feels Bout Carl Gustav Jung...