"Assessing the WWII Decision-Making of Admiral Chester Nimitz" with Trent Hone and Jon Parshall

Published 2022-03-01
00:00 - Trent Hone - "Organizing for Rapid Sensemaking: Admiral Chester W. Nimitz as CINCPAC and CINCPOA"

28:34 - Jon Parshall - "What Was Nimitz Thinking?"

All Comments (21)
  • @Drachinifel
    Excellent stuff as can only be expected from these fine gentlemen!
  • @EricDKaufman
    Thanks for having Drach on or I would have never discovered this FANTASTIC channel.
  • @chrisluttor2275
    My compliments to both Trent Hone and Jon Parshall for a great presentation. My one criticism is that Nimitz along with the entire US Naval Department took almost two years to fix the problems with the Mark 14 torpedoes. Nimitz's timeline could have been accelerated by at least six months if the US submarine fleet had achieved its 1944 successes in 1942.
  • The pic of Nimitz 'seeing with both eyes' at Trent's conclusion is absolutely sublime !
  • @v.mwilliams1101
    Thank you gentlemen, so very interesting. When listening to Mr Hone and Parshall it's 'the rest of the story'. Always providing the nitty gritty details.
  • I never pass up a chance to watch Parshall on any kind of a podcast or any kind of a lecture! And this is the second or third time I've watched Trent Hone on this book of his. One of them was on Drach's show just yesterday
  • @gruntforever7437
    we were very lucky Nimitz was running the pacific. His gamble on Midway was the key decision of the entire pacific war
  • Maybe your Spanish mathematicians could run a model to see how many extra Shattered Sword copies get sold from each Parshall YouTube appearance. To the enormous benefit of your viewers, it’s ‘good Parshall’ every time.
  • @MegaBloggs1
    great presentation-incorporating logistics and the command
  • Great lecture. The 'faded' Xs to mean damage or sunk are not easy to see. If you ever revise I suggest having the damaged a D or on a different side of the ship than the Sunk X.
  • One thing missing from his aggressive principles probably because it was passive, do not push to destruction unless there is no choice, getting down to 1 or 2 carriers as the case at the end of 42 was something he would not do unless forced. Midway and the other places carriers were getting sunk were not of choice but defensive engagements on their front line. If they were missing a carrier at Midway, they could have put the air group on Midway, the Midway air group really didn't do much and better planes and pilots on Midway might have allowed them to do what they did from the carrier.
  • It appears that Yorktown was crucial twice. First, with her offensive/attacking input. Second, with the aspect of “operational” defense. If the crew had not been able to patch her up, to the point of steaming effectively, she wouldn’t have appeared to the Japanese as a “second” viable target to attack.
  • What was Mitscher's rationale for sending his planes in what turned out to be the wrong direction? Does anyone know?
  • I read a review from the Japanese side, specifically the target was the US carriers ....not Midway. Midway did not have to be disabled or occupied....only the destination to have a carrier battle. As landing forces were allocated, the planning allowed the pitfall of diverting resources that should have been at the ready for carrier battle.
  • @GlennHa
    We had the best "German Admiral" of WW2.....Admiral Nimitz. Fortunately, he was on our side. We also had the best "German General" of WW2....General Eisenhower.
  • Can you comment in the future about what might have been needed to get at least one boiler reactivated on the Yorktown so I could move out of range of subs?